It seems difficult and even futile to talk about methodologies for preventing and mitigating conflict in the midst of devastating wars like the one being fought in Ukraine. It seems superfluous and even strident to speak of diplomacy in the face of the débâcle of reason and reasonability that we witness every day. And yet, not so long ago, there was a time – it was the year 2005 – when the international community thought it could equip itself with a flexible and calibrated doctrine to be activated precisely to avert/defuse conflicts or to reduce their devastating impact.
By Loretta Bondì
This is the Responsibility to Protect doctrine, also known by its acronym R2P, which world leaders approved at the 2005 summit, albeit with inevitable skepticism and grumblings. The final document of the summit states, in paragraph 138, that “Every single State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We accept this responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The international community should, as appropriate, encourage and assist States to exercise this responsibility.”
This solemn pledge was the logical precipitate of the work of the International Commission on State Intervention and Accountability (2001) and counted heavy-weight champions who were not prone to wishful thinking, such as Gareth Evans, former Australian foreign minister, and Louise Arbour, chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda and later UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.
Perfected after the military intervention in Kosovo, the doctrine turns on its head and criticized the notions of military interference and the “right” to intervene in the presence of serious violations of human rights. These assumptions reflected not only arbitrary decision-making, political interests and factionalism under the cloak of humanitarianism. They also established a hierarchy between those who would receive protection and those who could be ignored.
Pivoting on the protection and respect of human rights and international humanitarian law, R2P focuses not on the pure or specious motivations of the involved or intervening states, but on the views and interests of the victims of abuses and violations. It is activated only when the States involved in a conflict are unable or unwilling to put an end to atrocities or are directly responsible for gross and systematic human rights violations, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.
Louise Arbour noted: “At its core, the standard provides a definition of broad public interest based on universal human rights while appealing to practical wisdom in ‘addressing ongoing threats and abuses before a crisis develops and spills over elsewhere with unpredictable consequences.”
To this end, the duty to protect in R2P stretches across a continuum of prevention, response, and commitment to reconstruction, ranging from early warning, diplomatic pressure, coercive measures (such as, for example, sanctions), accountability for those guilty of human rights violations, and post-conflict rehabilitation of institutions, structures, and community relations. Tailored to each situation, the norm aims to fill “gaps” or “breaches” in the protection of civilians and can be activated at the earliest warning of conditions that threaten to deteriorate, and it remains operational until respect for rights and justice are restored. This last point is crucial: the norm, in fact, aims to defuse rapid and disastrous “exit strategies” of the countries involved and of the international community and considers the post-conflict commitment not as an afterthought, but as an integral part of the protection planning, thus stimulating balanced and timely assessments on the choices necessary to ensure that neither inaction nor excessive reactions are viable or condonable options. In synthesis, the norm precludes the automatic use of military force and attributes precise responsibilities for responses and remedies, whether they are given or not.
In order to convert its theoretical framework into political practice, the norm is equipped with a series of mechanisms available both in the “toolbox” of the UN and in that of States and regional organizations. In terms of prevention, for example, these tools relate to early warning, cooperation to development, independent fact-finding missions, and diplomacy. Sanctions and peacekeeping missions are part of the reaction phase. In this second, more “muscular” phase, it is important to refer to the UN practice of “smart sanctions”, i.e., those aimed at targeting top government’s echelons and administration, the elites, and the military and repressive apparatus (with an arms embargo, financial measures, travel ban, for example), but not at weakening the country’s population indiscriminately. Of equal importance in this second phase is the application of UN Resolution 1325 of 2000 on “Women, Peace and Security” which explicitly mentions the impact of war on women and their contribution in conflict resolution for lasting peace. The third phase of application of the norm concerns, finally, humanitarian aid and reconstruction of institutions, structures, infrastructure, and the civic and social fabric. Even in this last phase, the application of 1325 is crucial.
Despite its rationality and the lack of plausible alternatives available to the international community, R2P has immediately navigated in troubled waters and has often been applied by states with a “supermarket” perspective, i.e. I take what I need and leave the rest on the shelves. This is due not only to the all too obvious difficulties in finding the political will to act in concert in the face of simmering, imminent or deflagrated crises. Persistent doubts also concerned the legal foundation on which the action of the international community should rest, even if it is precisely politically binding norms such as R2P that pave the way for the expansion of international law which gives voice and negotiating power to victims against the reasons of the strongest. Perplexities have been expressed about the timing, sequence, and mix through which protection measures should be applied.
Finally, there has never been a definitive consensus on who should be the frontline activator of the norm when affected states abrogate their protection responsibilities.
The UN because of its vocation and regional proximity organizations because of their greater ability to influence the parties to the conflict through their proximity to the theater of events and knowledge of potential crimes should be the drivers of action. History, however, teaches us that both the UN and the European Union or other regional organizations, far from being pivotal and propulsive vectors of the diplomatic effort or at least Convitati di Pietra (Stone Guests) on the stage of the strong, have too often proved to be mere clay footed theatre extras.
